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The Error of Eckles: Why Seniority Rights
Present an Undue Hardship for Employees with
Disabilities
In a September 1991 editorial, The Washington Post extolled
the early results of the recently passed Americans With Disabili-
ties Act' (the "ADA") as a "pleasant surprise."2 Although oppo-
nents of the ADA predicted prior to its passage that the ADA
would create a myriad of problems for small businesses and
municipalities, the Post editorial proclaimed that the actual
implementation of the ADA erased those fears.' The Post con-
ceded that serious issues involving collective bargaining agree-
ments, among other things, had been left unresolved, however it
predicted that "the vast majority of disputes will be settled by
good sense and good will."
4
Indeed, this seemed to be the hope of Congress when it enacted
the ADA.5 The legislative history, for example, reveals an admo-
nition by Congress to unions and employers that they should
negotiate provisions in their collective bargaining agreements
that would allow both to take all necessary actions to comply
with the ADA.6
The failure of Congress to provide express language in the
ADA indicating whether the rights of a disabled employee super-
sede those of employees protected by a collective bargaining
agreement, however, has led to much debate and some conflict-
ing decisions regarding whose rights are greater.7 This debate is
1. 42 U.S.C. § 12101-12213 (1995 & Supp. 1997). Congress enacted the ADA to
eliminate discrimination against disabled individuals with respect to employment, public
transportation and public facilities. Id.
2. Some Good Civil Rights News, THE WASHINGTON POST, Sept. 9, 1991, at A14.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. See, e.g., Mary K O7Melveny, The Americans With Disabilities Act and Collec-
tive Bargaining Agreements: Reasonable Accommodations or Irreconcilable Conflicts?, 82
Ky. L.J. 219, 235 (1994)(noting that instead of tackling the issue of potential conflicts
between collective bargaining agreements and the ADA, Congress hoped that employers
and unions would simply agree to "override" language in order to preempt any conflicts).
6. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 485 (II), 101st Cong., 2d Sess. at 63, reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N 303, 314. The ADA covers both employers and unions.
7. Although the ADA does not contain express language regarding whose rights
trump, the legislative history indicates that collective bargaining agreements are to be
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especially troubling with regard to accommodating disabled
employees in violation of a seniority provision in a collective bar-
gaining agreement. Problems arise when employers and unions
fail to provide language in collective bargaining agreements
enabling them to accommodate disabled employees in violation of
the seniority provisions. Even more troubling, however, is the
situation where that language exists, but those who must
approve the accommodation are bereft of either "good sense or
good will."
Such was the case of Terry Eckles, a railyard worker who
sought a reasonable accommodation for his disability.8 When the
reasonable accommodation Eckles requested, and his employer
provided, conflicted with a seniority provision in his union's col-
lective bargaining agreement providing for the reassignment of
disabled employees without appropriate seniority, Eckles' own
union representative thwarted his accommodation request.9
Instead of showing the good sense and good will that The Wash-
ington Post and Congress hoped would prevail, this union repre-
sentative placed himself in the very job that Eckles sought to
accommodate his disability."° Additionally, the union and the
employer used the seniority provision in the collective bargaining
agreement to successfully defend a discrimination claim filed
against them by Eckles under the ADA."
This comment analyzes the Eckles decision and its shortcom-
ings. Part I of this comment reviews the Eckles decision and
focuses on the court's rationale for concluding that seniority
rights trump the ADA. Part II evaluates the precedential value
of the Rehabilitation Act cases the court relied upon in reaching
its decision. In Part III, the comment explores the legislative
history of the ADA and the regulations promulgated pursuant to
the ADA in order to illuminate Congress' intended resolution of
an Eckles type issue. Part IV then discusses the policy consider-
ations behind the ADA to explain the role seniority provisions
should play in implementing the ADA. Finally, part V of this
comment suggests a test for courts to use in evaluating an Eckles
but one of many factors used in deciding whether a particular reassignment is reason-
able. See H.R. REP. No. 485 at 63.
8. Eckles v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 94 F. 3d 1041, 1043 (7th Cir. 1996).
9. Eckles, 94 F.3d at 1044. Rule 2-H-1 in the collective bargaining agreement
permitted disabled employees, upon agreement by both Conrail and the UTU, to "bump"
more senior employees in order to obtain a position meeting the disabled employee's
recent restrictions. Id. at 1044 n.2.
10. Id. at 1043.
11. Id. at 1051.
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issue and determining the rights of those covered by both senior-
ity provisions in a collective bargaining agreement and the ADA.
I. THE WOLF FINALLY CAME
On May 25, 1993, the predictions of many commentators on
the ADA finally materialized. 2 On this date, Terry Eckles filed a
discrimination complaint against his employer and union alleg-
ing that the ADA allows for an employer to reassign a disabled
employee as a reasonable accommodation even when the reas-
signment violates a bona fide seniority provision in a collective
bargaining agreement.
13
Although Congress, the National Labor Relations Board (the
"NLRB") and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(the "EEOC") all failed to explicitly state which statutory right
should prevail in this situation, some commentators, as well as
Congress, the NLRB and the EEOC believed that issues of this
kind would resolve themselves in the workplace. 14 But when
Eckles, his employer and union representative could not agree on
a reasonable accommodation for Eckles' disability, the United
States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana had to
confront this weighty issue.'
5
Eckles worked for Consolidated Rail Corporation ("Conrail") as
a yardmaster in an Avon, Indiana railyard.16 He was also a
member of the United Transportation Union ("UTU"), which rep-
12. See, e.g., Rose Daly-Rooney, Reconciling Conflicts Between the Americans With
Disabilities Act and the National Labor Relations Act to Accommodate People With Disa-
bilities, 6 DEPAuL Bus. L.J. 387 (1994); Joanne Ervin, Reasonable Accommodation and
the Collective Bargaining Agreement Under the Americans With Disabilities Act, 1991
DET. C.L. REV. 925 (1991); Ann C. Hodges, The Americans With Disabilities Act in the
Unionized Workplace, 48 U. MiA.u L. REv. 567 (1994); Jerry Hunter, Potential Conflicts
Between Obligations Imposed on Employers and Unions by the National Labor Relations
Act and the Americans With Disabilities Act, 13 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 207 (1993); Barbara A.
Lee, Reasonable Accommodation Under the Americans With Disabilities Act: The Limita-
tions of Rehabilitation Act Precedent, 14 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 201 (1993);
O'Melveney, supra note 5, at 1.; Eric J. Stahlhut, Playing the Trump Card: May an
Employer Refuse to Reasonably Accommodate Under the ADA by Claiming a Collective
Bargaining Obligation, 9 LAB. LAWYER 71 (1993).
13. Eckles v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 890 F. Supp. 1391, 1397 (S.D. Ind. 1995).
14. See Eckles, 890 F. Supp. at 1402-03 (noting that the General Counsel of the
NLRB addressed but did not resolve this issue in a published 1992 memorandum, and
that the EEOC published a technical assistance manual on ADA compliance without com-
ing to a resolution on the issue). See also O'Melveney, supra note 5, at 241-42 (suggesting
that negotiating accommodations through the collective bargaining process would be pref-
erable to accommodating a disabled employee by completely ignoring seniority
provisions).
15. Eckles, 890 F. Supp. at 1401.
16. Id. at 1394.
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resented the employees at that facility and had a collective bar-
gaining agreement with Conrail covering Eckles. 17
Eckles' position as yardmaster at the Avon yard required him
to work in an office several stories above the yard.' 8 Eckles could
only reach this enclosed office by climbing several flights of an
open, outdoor, metal staircase. 19 Additionally, Eckles' position at
the yard was an "extra board" position, meaning that he had to
fill in for sick or vacationing yardmasters and therefore work a
variety of shifts.2 °
In May of 1992, Eckles suffered a seizure and was diagnosed
with epilepsy.2 ' Eckles' physician advised that he no longer work
varying shifts and refrain from climbing the open flights of stairs
at his job. 22 Eckles therefore sought a position at another Con-
rail railyard as a reasonable accommodation satisfying these
restrictions.23 Pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement,
this transfer could not be accomplished without both union and
employer approval because Eckles lacked the seniority for the
position he sought.' While Conrail readily agreed to the reas-
signment, UTU Local 63 hesitated, agreeing only after Eckles
filed a discrimination complaint with the EEOC.25
Eckles worked at the new position for five months before the
UTU alleged that Eckles' medical restrictions had changed.26
Although Conrail did not concur with the UTU regarding a
change in Eckles' medical status, Ron Clark, Eckles' union repre-
sentative, acted for the UTU and unilaterally rescinded the
agreement permitting Eckles' initial transfer.2 Adding insult to
injury, Clark himself took the employment position that Conrail
and the UTU had only five months earlier provided to Eckles as a
reasonable accommodation for his epileptic condition. 8
With no other available position meeting his medical restric-
tions, Eckles went on sick leave from November of 1992 until
April of 1993.29 Although he was able to bid on an adequate posi-
tion on April 28, 1993, he continued to press the UTU for a trans-
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 1394-95.
20. Eckles, 890 F. Supp at 1394.




25. Eckles, 890 F. Supp. at 1395.
26. Id. at 1395-96.
27. Id. at 1395.
28. Id. at 1396.
29. Id.
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fer pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement that would
protect him from being bumped from this position by a more
senior yardmaster.3 0 The UTU steadfastly refused to grant this
request.3 '
Confronted with an unwilling union and a powerless employer,
Eckles filed an ADA discrimination claim against the UTU, its
local and Conrail.2 Claiming that the collective bargaining
agreement prohibited them from accommodating Eckles in the
manner he sought, the UTU and Conrail moved for summary
judgment on the matter.' The United States District Court for
the Southern District of Indiana, in a thorough and lengthy opin-
ion, agreed with the UTU and Conrail and granted their sum-
mary judgment motion.34 Eckles then appealed to the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals, which upheld the ruling of the trial
court.35
The Seventh Circuit's analysis focused on the definition of rea-
sonable accommodation in the ADA. 6 The court considered the
inclusion of "reassignment to a vacant position," in the textual
definition of the term, to be a factor which weighed in favor of the
defendants' position that Congress did not intend other employ-
ees to yield their positions to accommodate disabled employees.
The court reasoned that open positions will rarely be "vacant"
when a seniority system exists, because some employee with the
required seniority will expect to fill that position .3  The court
concluded, however, that the text of the ADA did not expressly
validate either of the parties' contentions. 9
30. Eckles, 890 F. Supp. at 1396.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 1397. The ADA provides that:
No covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability
because of the disability of such individual in regard to job application procedures,
the hiring advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job
training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.
42 U.S.C. § 12112 (1995 & Supp. 1997). The ADA defines a covered entity to include
unions and employers. Id. § 12.
33. Eckles, 890 F. Supp. at 1397.
34. Eckles, 94 F. 3d at 1043.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 1047. Because neither defendant argued that the proposed accommoda-
tion would impose an undue hardship on its "business," the court narrowed the issue
before it to whether the ADA requires employers to reassign disabled employees in viola-
tion of a bona fide seniority system of a collective bargaining agreement when that reas-
signment is the only way the disabled employee can be reasonably accommodated. Id. at
1045-46. See also 42 U.S.C. 12111(9) (date), defining reasonable accommodation for pur-
poses of the ADA.
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The court then looked to cases decided under the Rehabilita-
tion Act of 19731° because the term "reasonable accommodation"
originated in EEOC regulations implementing that statute.4'
The court found that under the Rehabilitation Act, courts have
unanimously held that employers are not required to reassign a
disabled employee in violation of a bona fide seniority system in
order to provide a reasonable accommodation. 42 Congress, there-
fore, drafted the ADA against a backdrop of cases which unani-
mously held that seniority rights trump those of disabled
employees seeking reasonable accommodation.4 Differences
between the 1973 Act and the ADA did not dissuade the court
from finding the Rehabilitation Act cases appropriate in deter-
mining the meaning of "reasonable accommodation" in this
instance."
Though both sides relied upon the House and Senate Reports
regarding the ADA, the court agreed with the defendant's conclu-
sions, pointing to an explicit Congressional statement that the
ADA does not require "bumping' another employee out of a posi-
tion to create a vacancy."45 According to the court's interpreta-
40. 29 U.S.C. § 701- (1995 & Supp. 1997).
41. Eckles, 94 F.3d at 104748 (citing Vande Zande v. State of Wisconsin Dept. of
Administration, 44 F.3d 538, 542 (7th Cir. 1995)(holding that when interpreting the ADA,
courts should look to decisions interpreting the Rehabilitation Act for guidance). The
court concluded that Congress incorporated the term "reasonable accommodation" from
the EEOC regulations under the Rehabilitation Act. Eckles, 94 F.3d at 1047.
42. Eckles, 94 F.3d at 104748, (citing Shea v. Tisch, 870 F.2d 786, 789-90 (1st Cir.
1989); Carter v. Tisch, 822 F.2d 465, 467-69 (4th Cir. 1987); Jasany v. United States
Postal Service, 755 F.2d 1244, 1251-52 (6th Cir. 1985); Mason v. Frank, 32 F.3d 315, 319-
20 (8th Cir. 1994); Daubert v. United States Postal Service, 733 F.2d 1367, 1370 (10th
Cir. 1984)). Moreover, courts developed a "virtual per se rule" that a reassignment which
violated provisions of a collective bargaining agreement would not be required under the
Rehabilitation Act's mandate to reasonably accommodate. Id.
43. Id. at 1048. Additionally, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII")
requires employers to reasonably accommodate the religious needs of their employees. 42
U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (1995 & Supp. 1997). The Eckles court also noted that in TWA v. Hardi-
son, 432 U.S. 63 (1977), the United States Supreme Court firmly rejected the notion that
the duty to reasonably accommodate the religious practices of some employees supersedes
the seniority rights of others. Id. (citing TWA, 432 U.S. at 79). The Eckles court cau-
tioned, however, against wholesale importation of Title VII and Rehabilitation Act case
law in interpreting the ADA because of profound differences between the statutes. Id.
Nevertheless, the court found these precedents to be useful guideposts in determining
what Congress intended by using the term "reasonable accommodation" in the ADA. Id.
at 104849.
44. Id. at 104849. An example of the differences between the ADA and the Reha-
bilitation Act is that the ADA includes reassignment as an example of a reasonable
accommodation, whereas the Rehabilitation Act does not explicitly include any mention of
reassignment.
45. Eckles, 94 F.3d at 1049-50. H.R. REP. No. 101485 (II), 101st Cong., 2d Sess.
63, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 314 provides: "The Committee also wishes to
make clear the reassignment need only be to a vacant position-bumping" another
employee out of a position to create a vacancy is not required." Id.
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tion of "vacant position," Eckles actually sought to "bump" other
more senior employees from the position he requested as a rea-
sonable accommodation.46 Relying on the House and Senate
Reports, the court concluded, served only to weaken Eckles' argu-
ment that the ADA required reassignment in this instance.47
In affirming the grant of summary judgment, the court did not
appear to find one of the above analyses any more persuasive
than the others. Indeed, each of these arguments appeared
inconclusive at best.4 The court concluded, however, that taken
together, the "text, background and legislative history of the
ADA" did not require reassignment in violation of a bona fide
seniority system.
49
II. RouND PEGS, SQUARE HOLES
The court erred when it relied on Rehabilitation Act precedent
to determine what the term "reasonable accommodation" means
under the ADA.5 0 Although this was an appropriate place to look
for the meaning of that term as it applied to the Eckles' situa-
tion,51 the court failed to analyze the holdings of the cases it cited
in support of its proposition that "reasonable accommodation"
does not require reassignment in violation of a bona fide senior-
ity system.52 If the court had made a more critical inquiry into
the rationale of these decisions, it would have found not only that
the Rehabilitation Act, unlike the ADA, does not require reas-
signment in any instance, but that courts in these cases relied
more on that omission than any hierarchy of rights in reaching
46. Eckles, 94 F.3d at 1047.
47. Id. at 1049-50.
48. Id. at 1047-49.
49. Id. at 1051.
50. See, e.g., Stahihut, supra note 12, at 87-89 (questioning the use of Rehabilita-
tion Act precedent in evaluating ADA's effect on collective bargaining rights); Daly-
Rooney, supra note 12, at 395-96 (suggesting that Rehabilitation Act cases provide no
more than dicta with respect to requiring reassignment in violation of other employees'
seniority rights); Lee, supra note 12, at 205-07 (stating that reliance on Rehabilitation
Act case law may not always be appropriate for issues arising under the ADA); Jeffrey 0.
Cooper, Overcoming Barriers to Employment: The Meaning of Reasonable Accommoda-
tion and Undue Hardship in the Americans With Disabilities Act, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 1423,
1436 (May, 1991) (cautioning courts that uncritical application of Rehabilitation Act pre-
cedent creates a "substantial danger that they will understate the burdens that Congress
intended to impose on employers in the ADA").
51. See, e.g., Vande Zande v. Wisconsin Department of Administration, 851 F.
Supp. 353, 359 (W.D. Wisc. 1994Xnoting that because of the close relationship between
the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act, Rehabilitation Act precedent would be useful in
interpreting the ADA, but need not be controlling).
52. Eckles, 94 F.3d at 1047-48.
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their respective holdings.13 The court's conclusion that "a virtual
per se rule has emerged" from these cases illustrating that the
Rehabilitation Act does not require reassignment in violation of a
bona fide seniority system proves too much. 4 More accurately,
those courts held either that the Rehabilitation Act did not
require reassignment under any circumstances or that the
employee did not fall under the protection of the Act.55
In Carter v. Tisch,56 one of the cases the Eckles court relied
upon, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the United
States Postal Service did not violate the Rehabilitation Act when
it refused to reassign a disabled employee in violation of a senior-
ity provision in a collective bargaining agreement.5 7 In reaching
this conclusion, the court relied primarily on the fact that the
Rehabilitation Act does not require reassignment of a disabled
employee as a reasonable accommodation for that disability.5"
To bolster this holding, the court noted that other courts have
also found that the Rehabilitation Act does not require reassign-
ment in violation of the seniority rights of other employees.5 9
Although the court felt this gave the USPS greater justification
in refusing the reassignment, the court's primary rationale was
clear: "the overwhelming weight of authority" indicated that the
53. See, e.g., Shea v. Tisch, 870 F.2d 786, 790 (1st Cir. 1989)(finding that "over-
whelming weight of authority" opposes contention that Rehabilitation Act requires reas-
signment as a reasonable accommodation); Carter v. Tisch, 822 F.2d 465, 468-69 (4th Cir.
1987)(concluding that no court has found EEOC regulations defining reasonable accom-
modation under the Rehabilitation Act to require reassignment); Carty v. Carlin, 623 F.
Supp. 1181, 1189 (Md. 1985Xholding that "an employer under the Rehabilitation Act is
not required to reassign a handicapped person as a reasonable accommodation").
54. Eckles, 94 F.3d at 1047-48.
55. See, e.g., Shea, 870 F.2d at 790; Carter, 822 F.2d at 469; Jasany v. USPS, 755
F.2d 1244, 1250 (6th Cir. 1985) (concluding Rehabilitation Act does not cover the plaintiff
because he failed to show he was handicapped within meaning of the Act); Mackie v.
Runyon, 804 F. Supp. 1508, 1511 (M.D. Fla. 1992)(holding Rehabilitation Act does not
require reassignment as a reasonable accommodation); Davis v. USPS, 675 F. Supp. 225,
233-34 (M.D. Pa. 1987Xruling that duty to reasonably accommodate pursuant to Rehabil-
itation Act does not include a requirement to reassign disabled employee); Carty, 623 F.
Supp. at 1189.
See also Daly-Rooney, supra note 12, at 395-96 (noting that while the aforemen-
tioned cases "are cited for the proposition that an accommodation is unreasonable if it
conflicts with the collective bargaining agreement. . .[tlhese cases [actually] discuss
whether reassignment is a contemplated alternative for accommodating the worker with
a disability."); Lee, supra note 12, at 223 (stating that "... .courts should reject Rehabilita-
tion Act precedent when a contract's seniority rights are raised as a defense").
56. 822 F.2d 465 (4th Cir. 1987).
57. Carter, 822 F.2d at 466-67.
58. Id. at 467-68 (citing Carty v. Carlin, 623 F. Supp. 1181, 1189 (D. Md. 1985)).
59. Id. (citing Jasany v. USPS, 755 F.2d 1244, 1250 (6th Cir. 1985; Daubert v.
USPS, 733 F.2d 1367, 1370 (10th Cir. 1984)).
1030
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Rehabilitation Act simply does not require reassignment as a
means of reasonably accommodating a disabled employee.
6 °
In Daubert v. USPS,61 another case cited by the Eckles court,
the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals stated that the Postal Service
could rely on the seniority provisions of a collective bargaining
agreement as a legitimate business reason for discharging a dis-
abled employee without reassigning her to a position for which
she lacked the requisite seniority.62 The court held that regard-
less of any problems with the collective bargaining agreement,
the disabled employee failed to meet the criteria for Rehabilita-
tion Act protection.' The court's lengthy analysis as to why the
employee was not an "otherwise qualified handicapped person"
under the Act, as opposed to its terse pronouncement that the
collective bargaining agreement would prevail over the Rehabili-
tation Act, indicates that the court relied more on this fact in
dismissing the complaint than on any provisions of the collective
bargaining agreement.6 Furthermore, since this finding should
have rendered moot any arguments about whether reliance on a
collective bargaining agreement could serve as a legitimate busi-
ness reason for discharging a disabled employee, the brief discus-
sion about the effect of a collective bargaining agreement could
reasonably be interpreted as nothing more than dicta.65
60. Id. at 469. See also Shea, 870 F.2d at 789-90 (finding the holding in Carter
persuasive); Mackie, 804 F. Supp. at 1511 (stating that Rehabilitation Act does not
require postal service to reassign an employee with a disability to another position as a
reasonable accommodation); Carty, 623 F. Supp. at 1188-89 (concluding no cases have
held that the Rehabilitation Act requires reassignment as a reasonable accommodation);
Davis, 675 F. Supp. at 235 n.9 (declining to decide whether the seniority provisions of a
collective bargaining agreement prevail over the Rehabilitation Act because the Act does
not require job reassignment as a method of accommodation).
61. 733 F.2d 1367 (10th Cir. 1984).
62. Daubert, 733 F.2d at 1369-70 (10th Cir. 1987). The court considered whether
the United States Postal Service violated the Rehabilitation Act by refusing to restruc-
ture the duties of a postal employee or reassign her to another position as an accommoda-
tion for her degenerative back disorder. Id. at 1370.
63. Id. at 1370-72.
64. Id.
65. Id. The Jasany court reached a similar conclusion in finding that the plaintiff
in that case could not avail himself of the Rehabilitation Act because he was not a handi-
capped person under the statute. Jasany, 755 F. 2d at 1250. The court only then went on
to discuss the issue of seniority rights and reasonable accommodation. Id. at 1250-51.
Since a finding that the plaintiff was not a handicapped individual under the Act was
dispositive on the issue, Jasany and Daubert appear to offer only dicta on the issue of
whether a collective bargaining agreement trumps the duty to reasonably accommodate.
At least one commentator has criticized the limited rationale employed in these
cases. See Stahlhut, supra note 12, at 79, n.83. Arguing that the courts failed to "fully
develop" the rationale behind why seniority rights trump a Rehabilitation Act request to
reasonably accommodate, the author was skeptical with respect to applying this rationale
to a request for an ADA reasonable accommodation. Id. See also Hodges, supra note 12,
at 592 (noting that the Rehabilitation Act cases do not include "extensive rationales" for
10311997
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There are additional reasons why the Rehabilitation Act cases
are of little value in analyzing an Eckles type situation.6 First,
the ADA, unlike other employment discrimination legislation,
does not include an express provision protecting the seniority
rights of other employees. This omission may reflect Congress'
intent to reject the line of Rehabilitation Act case law suggesting
that seniority rights trump those of the disabled employee.
68
Moreover, the legislative history illustrates that Congress did
address the issue of collective bargaining, calling on these agree-
ments to be but one factor in evaluating whether reassignment to
a vacant position would be a reasonable accommodation.69
Additionally, Rehabilitation Act precedent doesn't control an
Eckles type case under the ADA because the Rehabilitation Act
should be viewed as a floor, rather than a ceiling, when dealing
with rights of disabled individuals. 70 The ADA does not merely
incorporate the Rehabilitation Act, but expands upon that Act 71
by increasing the scope of protection for disabled persons. 72 The
concluding that existence of collective bargaining agreement precludes reassignment as a
reasonable accommodation).
66. See, e.g., Lee, supra note 12, at 206-08; Stahlhut, supra note 12, at 87-89; Daly-
Rooney, supra note 12, at 395-97.
67. See Stahlhut, supra note 12, at 87.
68. Id. See also Hodges, supra note 12, at 578, 596. Hodges stated that the omis-
sion was intentional. Id. at 578. She argued that the Rehabilitation Act also omitted any
explicit protection for seniority systems, yet courts have read that protection into that
statute. Id. at 596. Furthermore, Congress' silence on the issue implied an acceptance of
those decisions. Id.
69. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 485 (II), 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 63, reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 314.
70. See, e.g., Section 12201 of the ADA, providing:
[Niothing in (the ADA) shall be construed to apply a lesser standard than the stan-
dard's applied under title V of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 or the regulations
issued by Federal agencies pursuant to such title.
42 U.S.C. § 12201(a) (1995 & Supp. 1997). See also Cooper, supra note 50, at 1426 (stat-
ing that the ADA is "considerably more comprehensive" than the Rehabilitation Act); Lee,
supra note 12, at 250 (noting that "the ADA goes beyond the Rehabilitation Act in its
accommodation requirements, and judges very likely will view prior case law as a floor of
protection upon which to build new precedent').
71. See, e.g., Stahlhut, supra note 12, at 73, 87-88 (noting that: "The ADA estab-
lishe[d] a definition of reasonable accommodation that is significantly broader than the
reasonable accommodation obligation under the Rehabilitation Act.')(citing Burgdorf,
The Americans with Disabilities Act: Analysis and Implications of a Second-Generation
Civil Rights Statute, 26 HAv. CR-CL L REv 413, 511-12 (1991)).
See also Daly-Rooney, supra note 12, at 395 (stating: "Although the sponsors of
the ADA drew upon the regulations and case law of the Rehabilitation Act to create the
ADA, it was also their intent to 'create a statute that could stand on its own and not be
dependent on incorporation by reference to regulations issued under Section 504 [of the
Rehabilitation Act],")(citing response by Chai Feldblum, Legal Counsel to the American
Civil Liberties Union and drafter of the ADA, to the Honorable James Sensenbrenner,
Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 101st Cong. 2d Sess., Legislative History of Public Law 101-
336, The Americans With Disabilities Act, 107, 2219-20 (1990)).
72. Stahlhut, supra note 12, at 87-88.
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ADA also has more extensive regulations as well as a more com-
prehensive legislative history than its predecessor.73 Moreover,
the dearth of legislative history and regulatory language sur-
rounding the Rehabilitation Act has caused courts to narrowly
interpret that statute. 4 Thus, Rehabilitation Act precedent is of
limited value in resolving more complex issues under the ADA. 5
III. No MEANS No
The decision in Eckles is contrary to the explicit language of
the ADA and its legislative history. The court noted that the
ADA defines reasonable accommodation as including "reassign-
ment to a vacant position."76 Since Eckles did not seek a "vacant"
position, but an open position to which other, more senior
employees would be entitled, the court concluded that Eckles did
not seek a "reassignment to a vacant position" within the mean-
ing of the ADA.77 In reaching this conclusion, the Eckles court
imposed its own interpretation on what the ADA means by
"vacant" with no accompanying foundation in either case law or
the legislative history of the ADA.78 The court then used this
interpretation as a spring board to make a leap in logic. Accord-
ing to the court, since Eckles did not seek reassignment to a truly
"vacant" position, and ADA legislative history indicates that the
Act does not require "bumping" other employees to create a
vacancy, the ADA does not mandate Conrail to reassign Eckles in
violation of a bona fide seniority system.79
An analysis of the ADA and its legislative history, however,
reveals serious flaws in the Eckles court's interpretation. First,
the ADA explicitly requires employers to accommodate a dis-
abled employee through "reassignment to a vacant position." 0
73. Id.
74. Cooper, supra note 50, at 1424-25.
75. Even those commentators who have argued that seniority rights should prevail
over those of disabled persons under the ADA have recognized the limitations of Rehabili-
tation Act precedent in resolving this dilemma. See, e.g., O'Melveny, supra note 12, at
234 (noting that since the ADA, unlike the Rehabilitation Act, requires reassignment, it
is unclear whether the ADA provides the same deference to seniority rights as does the
Rehabilitation Act).
76. Eckles, 94 F.3d at 1047.
77. Id. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9) (1995 & Supp. 1997).
78. Eckles, 94 F.3d at 1047. One commentator has suggested that "it is reasonable
to argue that a position is not vacant under the ADA if it must be filled pursuant to a
seniority agreement." Jules L. Smith, An Employee Compliance Checklist: The Employ-
ment Provisions of the ADA, 39 FED. B. NEws & J. 81, 85 (1992). Smith, however, offers
no foundation for this argument in either the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act. Id. at 85.
79. Eckles, 94 F.3d at 1049-50.
80. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B) (1995 & Supp. 1997). The ADA defines reasonable
accommodation to include:
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The Act does not, as the Eckles court suggested, exempt vacant
positions that more senior employees under a collective bargain-
ing agreement may expect to fill."' Nor does the legislative his-
tory even intimate that this should be the case; rather, it merely
emphasizes that employers are not required to "bump" other
employees to create vacant positions in order to accommodate a
disabled employee.8 2
While the legislative history does not provide guidance as to
when a position is vacant, it does provide direction in determin-
ing how to resolve a conflict between reassignment and seniority
rights.8 " Both the House and Senate Reports indicate that the
provisions of a collective bargaining agreement may be a factor
in determining whether a particular accommodation, such as
reassignment, is reasonable.8 4 Moreover, the Reports mention
that a collective bargaining agreement with a seniority provision
may be a factor in determining whether it is reasonable to reas-
sign a disabled employee without the required seniority to a posi-
tion. 5 Finally, the House Report affirmatively states that a
collective bargaining agreement is not dispositive of the issue. 6
The fact that Congress intends a flexible, multi-factored
approach in determining whether a particular accommodation is
reasonable may also be seen in other portions of the ADA's legis-
lative history.87 In rejecting a per se approach regarding the cost
of accommodations, for example, Congress scrapped a proposal
which would have mandated that any accommodation costing
more than 10% of a disabled employee's salary is unreasonable.8'
job restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules, reassignment to a vacant
position, acquisition or modification of equipment or devices, appropriate adjust-
ment or modifications of examinations, training materials or policies, the provision
of qualified readers or interpreters and other similar accommodations for individu-
als with disabilities.
Id. Interestingly, a number of the above accommodations could also conflict with provi-
sions of a collective bargaining agreement including job restructuring and part-time or
modified work schedules. These conflicts, however, are outside the scope of this comment.
81. The ADA does not define the term "vacant position." See 42 U.S.C. §12111(1-
10) (1995 & Supp. 1997).
82. See H.R. REP. No. 485 (II), 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 63, reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 314.
83. See id. The House Report provides:
The collective bargaining agreement could be relevant, however, in determining
whether a given accommodation is reasonable. For example, if a collective bargain-
ing agreement reserves certain jobs for employees with a given amount of senior-
ity, it may be considered as a factor in determining whether it is a reasonable





87. Daly-Rooney, supra note 12, at 404-05.
88. Id.
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If Congress was unwilling to subject actual costs of accommoda-
tion to per se rules, it would also be unlikely to intend use of a per
se rule with respect to the reasonableness of reassignment in the
face of a conflicting collective bargaining agreement.8 9
Faced with the explicit language in the ADA and its legislative
history, at least one commentator has argued that while the leg-
islative history identifies a collective bargaining agreement as
only one factor in determining whether a particular accommoda-
tion is reasonable, a reassignment in conflict with the provisions
of a bona fide seniority system would be considered an undue
hardship and thus not required under the ADA. 90 Noting that
such an accommodation could alter or impair shift assignments,
transfers and promotions of nearly every employee, the commen-
tator concludes that an undue hardship exists when a reassign-
ment would violate the seniority provision of a collective
bargaining agreement. 91
This approach, however, fails to take into account any other
factors92 and simply resurrects the per se approach ostensibly
adopted by the Rehabilitation Act cases, labelling it an undue
hardship. The ADA clearly indicates that undue hardship claims
should be evaluated not only on a case by case basis, but on the
impact the accommodation would have on the employer and not
other employees.93 The collective bargaining agreement would
be but one factor in this analysis.9 4
One final error in the Eckles court's reading of the ADA is with
respect to its framing of the issue in that case. Perhaps influ-
enced by the manner in which the courts framed the issues in the
89. Id. Even some commentators arguing that the collective bargaining agreement
should prevail concede that the legislative history suggests "that a conflicting collective
bargaining agreement is not a complete defense" for failing to reassign an employee with
a disability. See, e.g., Hodges, supra note 12, at 599.
90. O'Melveny, supra note 12, at 238-42 (citing the EEOC, Technical Assistance
Manual on the Employment Provisions (Title I) of the ADA, Resource Directory (1992),
which provides that "it might be an undue hardship to reassign [a disabled employee] if
others had seniority for the ... job"). Id. at 239-40.
91. Id. at 239-40 n.86.
92. Id. at 239-41.
93. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10)(B) (1995 & Supp. 1997) (listing the factors
courts should consider in evaluating whether an accommodation presents an undue hard-
ship). See also Daly-Rooney, supra note 12, at 409 (stating that "[lit is also clear that
mere inconvenience of other workers does not qualify as a defense of undue burden.");
Eckles, 94 F.3d at 1050 n.15 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12111(2) (1995 & Supp. 1997) (rejecting
balancing approach based upon the impact the accommodation would have on other
employees because the ADA provides no criteria "for evaluating the effect of a given
accommodation on other employees-who do not qualify as 'covered entities' under the
ADA")).




Rehabilitation Act cases, the court asserted that the issue before
it was "whether the ADA requires as 'reasonable accommodation'
that a disabled individual be given special job placement and job
protection . . . in violation of a bona fide seniority system ...
when such accommodation is the only way of meeting the job
restrictions of that disabled individual."95 Since the parties did
not assert that the proposed accommodation presented an undue
hardship, the court never reached the issue of whether an undue
hardship existed in this instance. 6
The language of the ADA indicates that the court should have
sua sponte considered not whether the accommodation was
allowed in Eckles, but whether the accommodation presented an
undue hardship.97 As stated previously, the ADA expressly
includes reassignment to a vacant position as an example of a
reasonable accommodation.98 The court, therefore, should have
considered the issue of whether the accommodation requested
presented an undue hardship, not whether the ADA requires
reassignment in violation of a collective bargaining agreement.99
Accordingly, the court should not have adopted a per se
approach in deciding that the ADA does not require reassign-
ment in violation of a collective bargaining agreement. Rather,
the court should have considered Eckles' case on the facts before
it since the ADA suggests that undue hardship be evaluated on a
case by case basis.
IV. WHERE'S THE POLICY
Perhaps the most disappointing aspect of the Eckles decision is
the court's omission of any policy discussion in determining
whether the ADA requires reassignment in spite of a conflicting
seniority provision in a collective bargaining agreement. In fail-
ing to do so, the Eckles court did a disservice to two statutes
enacted to improve the plight of working people.
The court overlooked the fact that under the ADA, a particular
worker's seniority rights are rarely pitted against a disabled
employee's right to reasonable accommodation. 100 An initial rea-
son for this rarity is that the ADA requires an employer to offer
only a reasonable accommodation, not the best accommodation or
95. Eckles, 94 F.3d at 1045-46.
96. Id. at 1045.
97. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111(9) and (10) (1995 & Supp. 1997).
98. Id. § 12111(9)(B).
99. As Barbara Lee states: "[T]he issue facing employers under the ADA is not
whether reassignment is required, but under what circumstances reassignment will pose
an undue hardship." See Lee, supra note 12, at 219-20.
100. See, e.g., Stahlhut, supra note 12, at 92-93.
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the accommodation preferred by the disabled employee. 10 1 If
another accommodation is available that would satisfy the
employee's needs without impinging upon the seniority rights of
other employees, the employer would only need to provide that
accommodation. 10 2  Additionally, accommodating a disabled
employee by reassigning the employee in violation of a bona fide
seniority system would not always put the rights of other
employees at risk.10 3 No other employee, for example, may have
enough seniority for the position in question. Even if there is an
employee with the required seniority, he would not necessarily
forego any other benefit of seniority by yielding the position to a
disabled worker."' Finally, of all the cases filed under the ADA,
approximately only 20% have alleged a failure to reasonably
accommodate. 0 5 Therefore, when all of these factors are consid-
ered, not only are seniority rights rarely jeopardized because of
the shear lack of instances involving a conflict between the rea-
sonable accommodation of a disabled employee and the seniority
rights of another employee, but even when they are jeopardized,
there are many options available to satisfy the goals of the stat-
utes involved and the expectations of the parties."°
The Eckles court also failed to consider the fact that seniority
rights have never been absolute. 0 7 Collective bargaining agree-
ments, for example, may provide "super seniority" for employees
who serve as labor representatives. 0 8  Additionally, some sen-
iority provisions include waivers that prevent those with special-
101. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.9 (1997) (giving the employer discretion in choosing which
accommodation to implement under the ADA).
102. Id.
103. See, e.g., Daly-Rooney, supra note 12, at 409-12 (warning that a per se
approach to this issue overprotects the rights of union workers while showing little
respect for ADA goals); Hodges, supra note 12, at 615-16 (asserting that not every con-
flicting accommodation has a direct impact on an employee's contractual rights).
104. Daly-Rooney, supra note 12, at 411-12 (noting that the "frequency in turnover
in those opportunities would inform the significance of the right at stake").
105. Hodges, supra note 12, at 618 n.277 (citing a statement by Christopher Bell,
Acting Associate Legal Counsel, Americans With Disabilities Act Services, EEOC, at ALI-
ABA Video Law Review, ADA (December 10, 1992)).
106. See, e.g., Daly-Rooney, supra note 12, at 409-12; Hodges, supra note 12, at 615-
19. With regard to the expectations of the parties, Daly-Rooney concedes that seniority
provisions in collective bargaining agreements do create legitimate expectations with
regard to promotions and filling vacant positions. Daly-Rooney, supra note 12, at 410. If
employers and unions, however, adhere to Congress' desire that they negotiate an agree-
ment that permits an employer to take the necessary steps to accommodate disabled
employees-such as the one that existed between Conrail and the ULTU-"then the expec-
tation that seniority will always prevail is no longer reasonable." Id.
107. See, e.g., Daly-Rooney, supra note 12, at 406-08.
108. Id. at 407. Such a provision enables labor representatives to avoid layoffs or be
called back earlier than other employees who may have greater seniority. Id.
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ized skills from being laid off before those with more seniority. 10 9
Finally, courts in the past have overridden seniority provisions
in order to remedy discriminatory practices of employers and
unions.110
An example of one case in which a court has overridden senior-
ity provisions in a collective bargaining agreement to remedy
past discrimination is Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co.'"
In Franks, the United States Supreme Court considered whether
it could award retroactive seniority status to a pool of job appli-
cants who were denied employment due to their race in violation
of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.12 Although the Court
recognized that Title VII contains an explicit provision protecting
bona fide seniority systems, it held that Title VII did not prohibit
the relief sought by the plaintiffs." 3 Examining the legislative
history surrounding the enactment of Title VII, the Court rea-
soned that Congress did not intend to prohibit the type of relief
sought by the plaintiffs. 1 4  The Court then weighed the impor-
tant policy goals behind Title VII and seniority provisions and
concluded that the only way to adequately achieve the goals of
Title VII was to override the seniority provision in the collective
bargaining agreement." 5
Eckles' case presented an analogous situation. Congress
enacted the ADA to "end discrimination against individuals with
disabilities and to bring persons with disabilities into the eco-
109. Id. (noting that this type of provision reflects the policy that exceptions to sen-
iority provisions are necessary at times for the sake of the continued existence of the
business).
110. Id. (citing Renee Cyr, The Americans with Disabilities Act: Implications for Job
Reassignment and the Treatment of Hypersusceptible Employees, 57 BRooK L. REV. 1237
(1992)).
111. 424 U.S. 747 (1976).
112. Franks, 424 U.S. at 750. Several employees and applicants brought this suit
against Bowman Transportation alleging that its policies and union policies discrimi-
nated against African-Americans. Id. at 750-51. Although the district court found Bow-
man's policies to be discriminatory, the court declined to grant any specific relief sought
by the plaintiffs, including retroactive seniority. Id. at 751.
113. Id. at 779. Section 703(h) of Title VII provides: "[I]t shall not be an unlawful
employment practice for an employer to apply different standards of compensation, or
different terms of, conditions, or privileges of employment pursuant to a bona fide senior-
ity or merit system." 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(h)(West 1994).
114. Id. at 758-62. The Court noted that: "There is no indication in the legislative
materials that § 703(h) was intended to modify or restrict relief otherwise appropriate
once an illegal discriminatory practice occurring after the effective date of the Act is
proved." Id. at 761-62.
115. Id. at 766-70. The Court stated that the award of retroactive seniority in no
way deprived other employees of their rights under the collective bargaining agreeement,
noting that "employee expectations arising from a seniority system agreement may be
modified by statutes (or subsequent agreements between the employer and the union)
furthering a strong public policy interest." Id. at 778-79.
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nomic and social mainstream of American life." ! 6 Additionally,
Congress wanted to increase productivity by employing disabled
persons, increase the number of employees in the work force and,
most importantly, obliterate the barriers faced by disabled indi-
viduals in all aspects of their lives.117 The legislative history of
the ADA is replete with examples of individuals with disabilities
who, although willing to work, could not do so due to pervasive
discrimination."" Congress thus sought to eliminate the obsta-
cles disabled individuals faced in the workplace by enacting the
ADA with the concept of reasonable accommodation as its corner-
stone.119 Courts should therefore consider these important objec-
tives when evaluating whether a disabled employee should be
reassigned in violation of a bona fide seniority system or stand in
line at the local unemployment office.
120
Furthermore, the Eckles decision provides little incentive for
unions and employers to voluntarily negotiate a waiver of senior-
ity rights to accommodate a disabled employee.' 2 1 Such a deci-
sion not only lowers the hopes of disabled workers for security in
employment, but also defeats the intention of Congress and the
EEOC. Both the EEOC and Congress had hoped that unions and
employers would resolve potential conflicts between the ADA and
collective bargaining agreements through waiver provisions in
subsequent agreements.
122
116. H.R. REP. No. 485 (II), 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 22, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
303, 304.
117. Id. at 32, reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 314.
118. Among other testimony, Congress cited a Louis Harris poll that indicated:
Americans with disabilities are uniquely underprivileged. They are much poorer,
much less well educated and have much less social life, have fewer amenities and
have a lower level of self-satisfaction than other Americans.
H.R. REP. No. 485 (II), 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 31, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 313.
119. Id. "Reasonable accommodation is a key requirement of the Rehabilitation Act
and of this Act." Id.
120. Even the most staunch advocates of seniority rights recognize that reassign-
ment, as a last resort, is preferable to discharging a disabled employee. See Hodges,
supra note 12, at 617 n.272 (citing Richard Bales, Title I of the Americans With Disabili-
ties Act: Conflicts Between Reasonable Accommodation and Collective Bargaining, 2 COR-
NELL J.L. & Pun. PoL'Y 161, 203 (1992)).
121. Hodges, supra note 12, at 620 n.287.
122. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 485 (II), 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 63, reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 345 (stating that "[c]onflicts between provisions of a collective bargain-
ing agreement and an employer's duty to provide reasonable accommodation may be
avoided by ensuring that agreements negotiated after the effective date of this title con-
tain a provision permitting the employer to take all actions necessary to comply with this
legislation"); Eckles, 94 F.3d at 1051 (indicating that the EEOC read an actual duty into
the ADA that employers and unions must negotiate a variance from seniority provisions).
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IV. EVERYBODY Is A CRrrIc
Resolving the Eckles dilemma is a difficult task. As stated ear-
lier, Congress, the NLRB and the EEOC all had trouble deter-
mining whether and when reassigning a disabled employee
should trump a bona fide seniority system in a collective bargain-
ing agreement. 123 Congress, for example, never clarified in the
ADA when reassignment overrides a bona fide seniority system.
Rather, it merely stated that reassignment was a reasonable
accommodation. 124 The legislative history provides that the
terms of a collective bargaining agreement may be considered,
but are not determinative in evaluating whether the accommoda-
tion poses an undue hardship.
21
The NLRB and EEOC also fail to light the way for courts
resolving this issue. 26 The General Counsel of the NLRB, for
example, issued a memorandum in 1992 addressing some of the
potential conflicts between the ADA and NLRA. 127 In attempting
to answer the issue presented in Eckles, the General Counsel
noted that if an "adequate alternative arrangement existed that
would not conflict with the collective bargaining agreement,"
then a union could resist even discussing a proposed accommoda-
tion that would conflict with provisions in a collective bargaining
agreement. 12 The General Counsel left dangling, however, the
question as to what happens when the proposed accommodation
violating the collective bargaining agreement is the only avail-
able accommodation.
29
The EEOC was equally vague when attempting to resolve this
particular issue. Initially, the EEOC noted that potential con-
flicts between the ADA and collective bargaining agreements are
"highly complex" and "require extensive research and analy-
sis."130 A year later, the EEOC issued a Technical Assistance
Manual to help resolve the problems created by integration of the
123. See supra note 14.
124. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B) (1995 & Supp. 1997). See supra note 80 for the text of
this provision.
125. H.R. REP. No. 485 (II), 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 63, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
303, 345.
126. See Americans with Disabilities Act, NLRB Gen. Coun. Mem. 92-9 (Aug. 7,
1992) and 56 Fed. Reg. 35,727 (1991). See also Hodges, supra note 12, at 607-08 (stating
that the EEOC and NLRB have provided little substantive guidance for employers,
unions and employees).
127' Americans with Disabilities Act, NLRB Gen. Couns. Mem. 92-9 (Aug. 7, 1992).
The memorandum also addressed issues of direct dealing and confidentiality which are
outside the scope of this comment.
128. Id.
129. See Eckles, 890 F. Supp. at 1402.
130. 56 Fed. Reg. 35,727 (1991).
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ADA into the unionized work force. 131 The Assistance Manual,
however, does little to clarify how to resolve an Eckles type situa-
tion. While the EEOC echoed Congress' stance that a collective
bargaining agreement may be considered as a factor in determin-
ing whether a particular accommodation poses an undue hard-
ship, it failed to develop standards for evaluating what weight to
accord a collective bargaining agreement and under what cir-
cumstances such an agreement may or may not be considered.
132
Commentators have also struggled with the issue. Some have
advocated balancing the interests of the affected parties, 133 while
others have suggested that unions and employers need to resolve
the conflict on their own. 134 At least one commentator has sug-
gested that Congress revisit the issue and legislate a solution. 35
This particular commentator has also advanced a solution based
on a derivative of the balancing approach. 36
Not one of these commentators, regulators or legislators, how-
ever, has asserted that courts should adopt a per se approach
reminiscent of the Rehabilitation Act cases and employed by the
court in Eckles. The Eckles court nonetheless found legitimate
shortcomings in each of the tests advanced by these commenta-
tors. 37 So how exactly should the courts evaluate an Eckles
issue?
Although the Eckles court did not agree, 3 8 the ADA, its regu-
lations and legislative history do provide an obvious solution.
13 9
131. EEOC, A Technical Assistance Manual on the Employment Provisions of the
ADA (1992).
132. In Eckles, Judge Flaum rejected another tack by the EEOC in the appeal of the
district court's decision. Eckles, 94 F.3d at 1051. The EEOC argued that the legislative
history indicates employers and unions have a duty to negotiate a waiver in a collective
bargaining agreement that would allow an employer to reassign a disabled employee in
violation of the agreement when the reassignment is the only available accommodation.
Id. Opining that the EEOC's approach lacked any foundation in the ADA or its legisla-
tive history, Judge Flaum rejected this argument. Id.
133. See, e.g., Stahlhut, supra note 12, at 93-96 (advancing an expectation of the
parties test); Daly-Rooney, supra note 12, at 413-15 (proposing a multifactorial test).
134. See O'Melveney, supra note 12, at 246-48 (suggesting that "[plotential conflicts
can be 'reasonably accommodated' if the time-tested collective bargaining process
becomes part of the day-to-day experience of the ADA's protections").
135. See Hodges, supra note 12, at 608 (stating that "[tihe best solution is a legisla-
tive one").
136. Id. at 615-17 (calling for an initial determination of whether actual or impor-
tant seniority rights are being infringed upon before determining whether the accommo-
dation creates an undue hardship).
137. Eckles, 94 F.3d at 1050-51 (criticizing the balancing approach as being standar-
dless and the EEOC approach as unwieldy).
138. Id. at 1049-50.
139. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9) and (10) (1995 & Supp. 1997); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.9




First, the ADA regulations as promulgated by the EEOC indicate
that as a threshold matter, the ADA should not trump a bona
fide seniority provision when another reasonable accommodation
is available. 1' ° In establishing a threshold, courts should not
only recognize the value of seniority rights and collective bar-
gaining in employment law, but also interpret the ADA in accord
with congressional intent and EEOC regulations.
1 4 1
As the ADA and its regulations indicate, an employer need not
provide a disabled employee with the particular accommodation
requested. 142 If more than one manner of accommodating that
employee exists, the employer may achieve the statutory require-
ment of reasonable accommodation by selecting among any of
those accommodations. 43 In this instance, a threshold test
would provide employers with a clear rule to follow to avoid lia-
bility under either the ADA or NLRA.
Cases that go beyond this threshold should be rare.'" When,
however, as in Eckles, a disabled employee can only be accommo-
dated by reassignment to a vacant position violating a bona fide
seniority system, a court need only look to the ADA, its regula-
tions and legislative history to resolve the issue. As noted ear-
lier, the ADA defines reasonable accommodation to include
reassignment to a vacant position. 45 Thus, the issue facing
employers and the courts would be whether such a reassignment
would cause an undue hardship on the employer.1 6 The issue
would not be, as the Eckles court framed it, whether the ADA
requires reassignment if the accommodation violates a bona fide
seniority system. 147 Neither the ADA nor its legislative history
qualify reassignment in this regard. The only statement Con-
gress makes on the issue is that a collective bargaining agree-
140. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.9 (1997). See also Stahlhut, supra note 12, at 93-94 (stating
that "the ADA does not necessarily require an employer to make the accommodation
requested by an employee as long as another method of accommodation is available. Also,
the ADA does not require an employer to assign an employee to a position with greater
seniority unless that employee cannot be accommodated in the position she already
occupies").
141. See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. § 1630.9 (1997)(giving employer discretion in accommodat-
ing disabled employee).
142. Id. See also 42 U.S.C. § 12116 (1995 & Supp. 1997)(providing authority for the
EEOC to issue regulations to implement the ADA).
143. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.9 (1997).
144. Stahlhut, supra note 12, at 92 (stating that since an employer need not provide
the particular accommodation the disabled employee requests, the ADA and seniority
provisions in collective bargaining agreements will conflict).
145. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B) (1995 & Supp. 1997).
146. Lee, supra note 12, at 223. Of course the accommodation must also enable the
employee to perform the essential functions of the job. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (1995 &
Supp. 1997).
147. Eckles, 94 F.3d at 1045-46.
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ment may be a factor in determining whether the
accommodation was reasonable.4's Thus, a collective bargaining
agreement is a factor in deciding whether such a reassignment
would pose an undue hardship on the employer. 149 The court
could then determine whether an accommodation poses an
undue hardship on the employer by evaluating the factors listed
within the ADA. 150 Far from being standardless and unwieldy,
this approach involves no more balancing than Congress explic-
itly intended. Since the ADA provides a test with explicit stan-
dards for courts to follow, 15 1 courts could avoid employing a per se
approach to a problem which Congress, the EEOC and virtually
all commentators believed should be resolved on a case by case
basis.
V. CONCLUSION
Despite the court's ostensibly thorough consideration of what
Congress intended as a "reasonable accommodation" in Eckles'
situation, the court's analysis fell short in a number of respects.
First, the court failed to analyze the Rehabilitation Act cases in
depth and merely accepted them on face value. 1 52 Second, the
court's conclusion that Eckles' request did not "constitute a 'reas-
signment to a vacant position,'" which the ADA expressly
required, lacked any analysis, let alone support in the legislative
history. 53 This conclusion created a third problem in the court's
treatment of the legislative history, virtually enabling it to
ignore express language that seniority provisions in collective
bargaining agreements would be but one of several factors in
determining whether a particular accommodation is reason-
able.' 54 Finally, the court failed to weigh any policy considera-
tions in concluding that a seniority provision in a collective
bargaining agreement trumps the ADA.'55
148. H.R. REP. No. 485 (II), 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 63, reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 345.
149. See id; 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10) (1995 & Supp. 1997). Neither the ADA nor its
legislative history suggest that the effects of reassignment be evaluated in light of its
potential impact on other employees. H.R. REP. No. 485 (II), 101st Cong., 2d Sess,
reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303; 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10). See also Lee, supra note 12,
at 223.
150. Section 12111(10) of the ADA lists the factors to be considered when evaluating
a claim of undue hardship. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10) (1995 & Supp. 1997).
151. The undue hardship analysis would also address the Eckles Court's concern
that employing a balancing test would be standardless. Eckles, 94 F.3d at 1050 n.15.
152. Id. at 1047-48.
153. Id. at 1047.
154. Id. at 1049-50.
155. The court engaged in virtually no discussion on the importance of seniority
rights in achieving the overall goal of labor peace intended by the National Labor Rela-
10431997
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The court's option for the status quo in Eckles indicates that
senseless, ill-willed individuals may defeat the intent of the ADA
by simply invoking the seniority provision of a collective bargain-
ing agreement.156 According to the Seventh Circuit, if a worker
becomes disabled on the job and the employer seeks to accommo-
date the disability by placing that worker in a vacant position,
another employee with more seniority can always defeat that
accommodation merely by showing that the collective bargaining
agreement mandates that only workers with a certain amount of
seniority are entitled to that position.157 Even if this was the
only accommodation available to the disabled employee, that
employee would not only be out of luck, but out of a job as well. 5 '
Congress certainly did not intend this kind of tough luck for indi-
viduals with disabilities when it enacted the ADA. 59
John W. Boyle
tions Act, as opposed to the very important goals advanced by the Americans With Disa-
bilities Act to eviscerate barriers for the physically disabled in seeking employment
opportunities.
156. Eckles, 94 F.3d at 1051. See also Chochrum v. Old Ben Coal Co., 102 F.3d 908
(7th Cir. 1996)(stating that pursuant to ADA, an employer is not required to reassign a
disabled employee in violation of the seniority provisions in a collective bargaining agree-
ment); Daigre v. Jefferson Parish School Board, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 494 (E.D. La.
1997)(noting that reasonable accommodation under ADA does not include reassignment
in violation of a bona fide seniority system); Collins v. Yellow Freight System, Inc., 942 F.
Supp. 449 (W.D. MO 1996)(holding that ADA does not require an employer to reassign a
disabled employee in violation of an existing collective bargaining agreement).
157. Eckles, 94 F.3d at 1051-52.
158. Id.
159. The ADA explicitly states that reasonable accommodation includes "reassign-
ment to a vacant position." 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B) (1995 & Supp. 1997). Furthermore,
the legislative history indicates that the overall purpose of the ADA is to "bring persons
with disabilities into the economic and social mainstream of American life." H.R. REP.
No. 485 (II), 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 22, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 304. Permit-
ting seniority rights to prevent a disabled individual from remaining employed certainly
would not advance the intent of Congress to keep these individuals in the socio-economic
mainstream.
See also Jerry Hunter, Potential Conflicts Between Obligations Imposed on
Employers and Unions by the National Labor Relations Act (the NLRA") and the ADA, 13
N. ILL. U. L. REv. 207, 214 n.33 (stating that if a proposed reassignment was the only
reasonable accommodation available, the ADA requires the employer to reassign the
employee even in the face of conflicting provisions of a collective bargaining agreement).
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